North Dakota Law Review
Volume 93

Number 2

Article 6

1-1-2018

Erased: State Burglary Convictions as Violent Felonies Under the
Armed Career Criminal Act
Matthew Kopp

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr

Recommended Citation
Kopp, Matthew (2018) "Erased: State Burglary Convictions as Violent Felonies Under the Armed Career
Criminal Act," North Dakota Law Review: Vol. 93 : No. 2 , Article 6.
Available at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr/vol93/iss2/6

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UND Scholarly Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in North Dakota Law Review by an authorized editor of UND Scholarly Commons. For more
information, please contact zeineb.yousif@library.und.edu.

ERASED: STATE BURGLARY CONVICTIONS AS VIOLENT
FELONIES UNDER THE ARMED CAREER CRIMINAL ACT
ABSTRACT
18 U.S.C. § 924(e), commonly referred to as the Armed Career Criminal
Act, imposes a fifteen-year mandatory minimum federal prison sentence for
a felon in possession of a firearm previously convicted of three “violent felonies.” Although at first glance the specific inclusion of burglary in the definition of qualifying offenses appears to encompass any state-law burglary
conviction, a morass of judicial tinkering has all but erased burglary from the
statute. The Armed Career Criminal Act now applies haphazardly based
solely on whether a defendant’s statute of conviction comports with several
layers of complex judicially created tests. As a result, the law subjects some
defendants to stiff mandatory minimum sentences while others who commit
identical crimes escape federal prosecution altogether. Through the lens of
recent decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit,
including an analysis of North Dakota’s burglary statute, this Note will illustrate the manifest uncertainty and frequent division among federal appellate
courts in determining if a state burglary conviction qualifies as a violent felony. Furthermore, it will argue that Congress must revisit the Armed Career
Criminal Act to mandate a conduct-based approach to analyzing burglary
convictions if the plain meaning of the statute, and its critical purpose of imposing uniform prison sentences on dangerous recidivists, is to be preserved.
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INTRODUCTION

On November 4, 2014, a West Fargo, North Dakota police officer approached a man walking near a red Mitsubishi Eclipse that had been the focus
of police attention for suspicious activity the day before.1 “Jon,” the man
said when the officer asked his name, refusing to provide further information.2 Because the car lacked registration and a license plate, officers impounded the vehicle.3

1. Brief for Appellee at 3, United States v. Kinney,—F.3d —, 2018 WL 1903772 (8th Cir.
Apr. 23, 2018) (No. 16-3764).
2. Id.
3. Id.
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After conducting an inventory search, police discovered the car had been
registered temporarily to Jonathan Lee Kinney, a five-time convicted felon.4
Under the driver’s seat of the vehicle, carefully wrapped in a handkerchief,
law enforcement discovered a handgun.5 Several months later in April 2015,
during a routine probation search of Kinney’s home, law enforcement discovered yet another firearm.6
North Dakota prohibits convicted felons from possessing firearms for
ten years following the latter of the date of conviction or completion of sentence, imposing a maximum penalty of five years in prison for a violation of
the statute.7 However, because four of Kinney’s five prior convictions were
for accomplice to burglary, he instead found himself staring down a mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen years in federal prison.8 Kinney’s burglary
convictions qualified him for the stout penalty created by the Armed Career
Criminal Act (“ACCA” or “Act”), a statute enacted to impose uniform and
severe prison sentences on dangerous repeat felons who continue to illegally
possess firearms.9
Codified as 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), ACCA, as amended in 1986, subjects a
felon in possession of a firearm previously convicted of three violent felonies
to a fifteen-year mandatory minimum federal prison sentence enhancement.10
In the absence of three qualifying violent felonies, the maximum penalty for
violating the federal felon in possession of a firearm statute is ten years.11 In
particular, § 924(e)(2)(B) provides three different routes for a court to find a
defendant’s prior conviction qualifies as a violent felony and therefore warrants an ACCA enhancement.12
First, a prior conviction is a violent felony if it “has as an element the
use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of

4. Id. at 3–4.
5. Id. at 3.
6. Brief for Appellee at 4, Kinney,—F.3d —, 2018 WL 1903772 (No. 16-3764).
7. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 62.1-02-09 (West 2017); see also N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.132-01 (West 2017) (defining the maximum allowable penalty for a class C felony as five years in
prison).
8. Brief for Appellee at 6–7, Kinney,—F 3d —, 2018 WL 1903772 (No. 16-3764).
9. Id.; see also H.R. REP. NO. 98-1073, at 2–3 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3661,
3662 (noting in the context of ACCA “[b]oth Congress and local prosecutors around the nation have
recognized the importance of incapacitating these repeat offenders”).
10. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2012).
11. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2012) (establishing as unlawful the possession of a firearm by
a person convicted of “a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year”); 18
U.S.C. § 924(a)(2) (2012) (defining the maximum allowable penalty for a violation of 18 U.S.C. §
922(g) as ten years imprisonment).
12. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (2012).
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another,” commonly referred to as the force clause.13 Second, a prior conviction qualifies if it is burglary, arson, extortion, or involves the use of explosives, referred to as the enumerated offenses clause.14 Finally, the statute
states a crime that “otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another” also qualifies as a violent felony, referred to as the residual clause.15 The Supreme Court held the residual clause
invalid as unconstitutionally vague in 2015.16 Accordingly, a conviction
must now satisfy either the elements clause or the enumerated offenses clause
to qualify as a violent felony.17
Ultimately, Kinney provided the government with substantial assistance
in an ongoing investigation, resulting in the district court imposing a significantly reduced sentence of ninety months in federal prison.18 Even so, United
States v. Kinney illustrates the potency of the Armed Career Criminal Act,
which often swaps a felon in possession charge that will likely amount to a
slap on the wrist in state court and replaces it with momentous, life-altering
consequences.19 ACCA is undoubtedly a critical, and indeed commonly employed, tool in the arsenal of federal prosecutors.20 But this tool will only
remain effective so long as it is applied consistently. That consistency is now
in serious jeopardy following several recent decisions of the United States
Supreme Court regarding ACCA’s specific inclusion of burglary as a qualifying violent felony.21
The Supreme Court’s judicially created tests to determine if a state burglary conviction qualifies as the “violent felony” variety of burglary is mindbogglingly complex at times and produces wildly inconsistent outcomes from
federal courts across the country. The result? Gaping disparity in sentences
13. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i) (2012).
14. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2012).
15. Id.
16. Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2563 (2015).
17. See id.
18. Brief for Appellee at 7, United States v. Kinney,—F.3d —, 2018 WL 1903772 (8th Cir.
Apr. 23, 2018) (No. 16-3764); see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (U.S.
SENTENCING COMM’N 2016) (permitting federal trial courts to impose a sentence lower than a prescribed statutory minimum for substantial assistance to authorities upon motion by the government).
19. Compare N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-32 (West 2017), with 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2012).
20. See DEP’T OF JUST., U.S. ATT’YS ANN. STAT. REP. at 16 (2016) (showing U.S. Attorneys’
Offices charged 11,656 defendants with violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922, 924 in Fiscal Year 2016).
21. Compare United States v. Bess, 655 F. App’x 518, 520 (8th Cir. 2016) (holding Missouri’s
second-degree burglary statute divisible and therefore a qualifying ACCA predicate); United States
v. Sykes, 844 F.3d 712, 715 (8th Cir. 2016) (same); and United States v. Phillips, 853 F.3d 432,
435 (8th Cir. 2017) (same), with United States v. Naylor, 887 F.3d 397, 407 (8th Cir. 2018) (en
banc) (holding Missouri’s second-degree burglary statute indivisible and therefore not a qualifying
ACCA predicate); and United States v. Bell,—F. App’x —, 2018 WL 1834502, at *1 (8th Cir. Apr.
18, 2018) (same).
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for defendants convicted under qualifying burglary statutes.22 With the only
difference being the state of conviction, some defendants face the full brunt
of the fifteen-year mandatory minimum penalty while others may not face
federal prosecution at all.23 Moreover, the Supreme Court’s interpretation of
ACCA has all but erased the word “burglary” from the statute, presenting a
stark example of judicial overreach into the prerogative of Congress.24
Part II of this Note provides background on the Supreme Court decisions
that create the modern framework for analyzing whether a state burglary conviction qualifies as a violent felony. Part III analyzes three recent decisions
from the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals that attempt to apply the Supreme
Court’s framework, illustrating multiple splits among the federal courts of
appeals. Part IV discusses the impact of the virtual erasure of burglary from
ACCA and argues that Congress must revisit the Act to endorse conductbased inquires for burglary offenses to remold ACCA into the effective law
enforcement tool the legislative branch originally designed. Finally, Part V
concludes this Note.
II. THE JUDICIAL FRAMEWORK FOR STATE BURGLARY
CONVICTIONS AS VIOLENT FELONIES
Four Supreme Court decisions demarcate the evolution of ACCA. In
1990, four years after the current version of the Act took effect, Taylor v.
United States25 determined state burglary statutes had to be the same or narrower than the Court’s sui generis definition of federal generic burglary to
qualify as ACCA predicates.26 Moreover, Taylor established the categorical
and modified categorical approaches to test whether state burglary statutes
comport with that generic federal definition.27 Fifteen years later, Shepard
v. United States28 conclusively defined the class of documents available for

22. For example, a person convicted of three burglaries in Wisconsin qualifies for an ACCA
enhancement. United States v. Lamb, 847 F.3d 928, 932 (8th Cir. 2017), petition for cert. filed (U.S.
Jul. 10, 2017) (No. 17-5152). Meanwhile, a person convicted of three identical burglaries just across
the St. Croix River in Minnesota would not qualify for the fifteen-year mandatory minimum. United
States v. McArthur, 850 F 3d 925, 940 (8th Cir. 2017).
23. See BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., NCJ 250183, FED. JUST. STAT., 2014 STAT. TABLES at 1112 (2017) (demonstrating United States Attorneys’ Offices decline federal prosecution for weapons
offenses in 26 3% of cases).
24. See discussion infra Part IV.
25. 495 U.S. 575 (1990).
26. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 599.
27. Id. at 602.
28. 544 U.S. 13 (2005).
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trial courts to analyze beyond the plain language of a state burglary statute
for ACCA purposes.29
Two opinions authored by Justice Kagan provide guideposts for the
modern analysis of burglary statutes under ACCA: Descamps v. United
States30 and Mathis v. United States31. These decisions denote a renewed
focus on the exact verbiage of state burglary laws to discern whether a statute
is divisible into separate elements or merely lists indivisible alternative
means. 32 The Supreme Court’s convolution of ACCA’s enumerated offense
clause has caused considerable headache for the federal judiciary, as evidenced by multiple splits among the federal courts of appeals following
Mathis, addressed in Part III.
A. CONGRESSIONAL INTENT, THE GENERIC FEDERAL DEFINITION
OF BURGLARY, AND THE CATEGORICAL APPROACHES
Constructing the framework for the modern treatment of state-law burglary convictions under ACCA necessarily begins with its plain language and
the prescribed congressional intent behind the statute. In particular, through
a protracted, and somewhat dubious, interpretation of the legislative history
of ACCA, the Supreme Court’s decision in Taylor v. United States established a generic federal definition of burglary as the measuring stick for
whether a state burglary conviction qualifies as a violent felony.33 To qualify, a state burglary statute must be the same as, or narrower than, the judicially determined generic federal definition of the crime.34 The case also
articulated two basic tests – the categorical and modified categorical approaches – to determine if a state burglary statute comports with federal generic burglary.35
To illustrate, in Taylor, the defendant challenged the application of the
fifteen-year ACCA enhancement the district court applied to his sentence.36
The defendant did not dispute that his prior robbery and assault convictions
qualified under the force clause but instead argued his two Missouri burglary
convictions did not qualify as violent felonies because they posed no risk of

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Shepard, 544 U.S. at 26.
570 U.S. 254 (2013).
136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016).
See discussion infra Part II.B.
Taylor, 495 U.S. at 599.
Id. at 602.
Id.
Id. at 579.
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physical harm to others.37 The Eighth Circuit affirmed the defendant’s sentence, concluding the specific use of the word “burglary” in ACCA meant
the enhancement applied regardless of the state’s definition of the offense.38
The Supreme Court ultimately reversed, but most importantly, the High
Court’s burglary definition differed dramatically, setting the stage for decades of confusion.39 To get to a final definition, Justice Blackmun, writing
for the majority, examined the legislative history of ACCA extensively.40
The Ninety-Eighth Congress originally enacted a much narrower version of
the Act in 1984, specifically applying the sentence enhancement only to convictions “for robbery or burglary.”41 The earliest iteration of the statute included an explicit definition for a qualifying burglary as “any felony consisting of entering or remaining surreptitiously within a building that is property
of another with intent to engage in conduct constituting a Federal or State
offense.”42
Critically, the modern version of the Act considered in Taylor inexplicably omits a specific definition of burglary.43 Notably, the Senate Report on
the original Act stated the purpose for explicitly defining burglary was to
“ensure, to the extent that it is consistent with the prerogatives of the States
in defining their own offenses, that the same type of conduct is punishable
on the Federal level in all cases.”44 Rather than assume this later omission
signaled a shift in congressional intent, the Court dismissed the lack of a definition as an oversight, speculating it “may have been an inadvertent casualty
of a complex drafting process.”45
After rejecting each of the various definitional alternatives other federal
appellate courts and the defendant proffered, the Court arrived at its own definitive definition through the examination of contemporary American criminal law.46 The Court accordingly held sui generis, citing from a lone treatise,
the generic federal definition of burglary to be “unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or structure, with intent to commit a
crime.”47 Even so, the Court still faced the task of establishing a judicial
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id.
Id.
See discussion infra Part III.
Taylor, 495 U.S. at 581.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 582.
S. REP. NO. 98-190, at 20 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3199.
Taylor, 495 U.S. at 589–90.
Id. at 598.
Id. at 599.
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approach to determine whether a state burglary statute comported with the
newfound definition.
To accomplish this task, the Court explained that if a state burglary statute had the same elements as generic burglary, or a narrower definition that
necessarily required finding the generic elements, the statute qualified under
the categorical approach.48 However, the Court next noted every federal
court of appeals had held a strict categorical approach applied, meaning
courts could only compare the language of the statute at issue to the generic
federal definition.49 Accordingly, the rote and exclusive application of the
categorical approach precluded courts from examining the underlying facts
of a prior conviction to determine if the defendant’s conduct met the generic
definition.50 The Supreme Court, recognizing the obvious constriction imposed by the status quo, consequently endorsed an additional test for courts
to apply if the plain language of the statute swept broader than the generic
federal definition, later mundanely dubbed the modified categorical approach.51
Under the modified categorical approach, a court may find that a burglary offense qualifies as a violent felony if, even though the state statute of
conviction is broader than the generic federal definition, the jury necessarily
had to find each element of generic burglary.52 As an example, the Court
proffered a hypothetical statute that proscribed unlawfully entering both a
building and an automobile.53 The Court explained if the charging instrument
and the jury instructions only specified the defendant unlawfully entered a
building and not an automobile, then it followed that the jury necessarily
found each element of generic burglary to reach a guilty verdict.54 Thus, the
Court endorsed the ability of trial judges to look past the language of the
statute to a narrow class of documents, non-exhaustively including the charging instrument and jury instructions, to determine if a prior conviction constitutes a violent felony.55
Although the Taylor Court definitively included charging documents
and jury instructions as proper sources for trial courts to inquire into, it left

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id.
Id. at 600.
Id. at 602.
Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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open whether the modified categorical approach encompassed other trial-record documents.56 In 2005, the Supreme Court revisited Taylor for the first
time to conclusively determine the level of inquiry permissible beyond the
plain language of a statute when applying an ACCA enhancement.57
The Shepard Court decided to “adhere to the demanding requirement
that any sentence under ACCA rest on a showing that a prior conviction ‘necessarily’ involved (and a prior plea necessarily admitted) facts equating to
generic burglary.”58 Thus, the Court modestly expanded the permissible documents for examination to include the terms of a plea agreement or the transcript of a plea colloquy, in addition to charging documents and jury instructions.59
B. DIVISIBILITY AND ELEMENTS VERSUS MEANS: TOWARD A
GORDIAN KNOT
Although the Supreme Court definitively resolved the question of what
documents trial courts may inquire into, the modified categorical approach
remained nebulous. Rather than provide clarity, the Court’s next ACCA decision in 2013, Descamps v. United States, further muddied the waters and
began the path to erasing “burglary” from the statute.60 Most recently, in
2016, the Court’s decision in Mathis v. United States placed even more stringent scrutiny on burglary convictions as ACCA predicates, leading to a deluge of federal appellate court reviews of state burglary statutes.61
In Descamps, the Supreme Court scrutinized the application of the modified categorical approach to California’s burglary statute.62 The plea colloquy record showed the defendant burglarized a grocery store, an offense that
undoubtedly met the elements of generic burglary.63 California’s burglary
statute was notoriously broad – it did not specify whether the offense required
unlawful entry, meaning felony burglary under California law could have
conceivably included offenses such as shoplifting.64 Because of the statute’s
breadth, it did not qualify as an ACCA predicate under the formal categorical
approach.65 The federal district court then faithfully applied the modified
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id.
Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 16 (2005).
Id. at 24.
Id. at 26.
See discussion infra Part IV.
See cases discussed infra Part III.
Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 258–59 (2013).
Id. at 259.
Id.
Id. at 261.
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categorical approach, examining the defendant’s plea colloquy, one of the
documents the Supreme Court specifically endorsed just eight years before
in Shepard.66 The district court found clear evidence from the colloquy that
the defendant admitted to unlawfully entering a grocery store with the intent
to commit a crime and applied an ACCA enhancement.67
Even though the district court complied steadfastly with the modified
categorical approach, the Supreme Court nevertheless reversed.68 In the first
of two significant ACCA opinions authored by Justice Kagan, the Court held
trial courts could not apply the modified categorical approach to California’s
statute because it was indivisible.69 The Court reasoned the absence of a
requirement for unlawful entry meant a jury could convict the defendant of
burglary under California law without finding a necessary element of the generic offense.70 Requiring a sentencing judge to examine the specific factual
circumstances of a prior conviction that the jury or plea judge did not necessarily have to find to convict the defendant, the Court explained, ran afoul of
the modified categorical approach.71 Therefore, even though the plea colloquy plainly demonstrated the defendant’s crime satisfied the elements of generic burglary, the Supreme Court held the modified categorical approach did
not apply to indivisible statutes.72
Justice Alito countered the majority’s constriction of burglary as a predicate offense under ACCA with a vociferous dissent. First, and critical to
understanding the Court’s later decision in Mathis, Justice Alito argued the
Court’s assumption that a statute proscribing burglary of a building, vessel,
or vehicle enumerated separate elements of burglary rested on unstable
ground.73 He asserted such a statute did not necessarily require a jury to find
unanimously, or a defendant to admit to a judge during a plea colloquy, the
specific place burglarized.74 For example, jurors tasked with deliberating a
burglary charge, but unable to determine unanimously if a defendant broke
into a building or a vehicle, could nonetheless convict the defendant of burglary under many state statutes.75 Accordingly, what the majority presumed
to be a clear-cut example of delineated alternative elements in fact potentially
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. at 259; Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 15 (2005).
Descamps, 570 U.S. at 259.
Id. at 260.
Id. at 278.
Id. at 264–65.
Id. at 265.
Id. at 278.
Descamps, 570 U.S. at 285–86 (Alito, J., dissenting).
Id. at 286.
Id. at 286–87.
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articulated alternative means of committing the crime.76 Justice Alito expressed dismay that the majority’s half-hearted divisibility analysis opened
the door to a strict elements versus means test – a prescient prediction later
vindicated in Mathis.77
Significantly, Justice Alito also pointed out that the Court’s holding
thwarted Taylor because it reverted to a modified categorical approach that
depended to some extent on the vagaries of state-specific statutes – a principle Congress explicitly rejected.78 Indeed, the majority’s holding effectively
eliminated convictions under California’s burglary statute from counting as
ACCA predicates, rendering conduct in California otherwise punishable in
qualifying states unusable for the enhancement.79
In place of the majority’s preclusion of the modified categorical approach, Justice Alito proffered a streamlined test that would allow a sentencing court to find a violent felony if “a defendant necessarily admitted or the
jury necessarily found that the defendant committed the elements of generic
burglary.”80 Because Descamps admitted he broke into a grocery store with
the intent to commit theft, Justice Alito asserted the conviction should have
counted as an ACCA predicate.81
Moreover, while Justice Kennedy joined the majority opinion, he expressed serious reservations about the Court’s reasoning and acknowledged
the validity of Justice Alito’s concerns.82 Importantly, he agreed that the distinction between divisible and indivisible criminal statutes was unclear and
feared the majority’s decision would invalidate “likely a large number” of
state burglary statutes as ACCA predicates, forcing legislatures to rewrite
their laws.83 Justice Kennedy concluded, “If Congress wishes to pursue
[ACCA] in a proper and efficient way without mandating uniformity among
the States with respect to their criminal statutes . . . [it] should act at once.”84
Unfortunately, rather than heed Justice Alito’s strict elements versus
means test warning, the Court barreled headlong into adopting that very test
only three years later.85 In Mathis v. United States, the Court declared statutes that merely list alternative means of committing burglary indivisible and
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. at 287.
Id. at 293; see generally Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016).
Descamps, 570 U.S. at 293 (Alito, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 281.
Id. at 296.
See id. at 279 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id.
Descamps, 570 U.S. at 279.
See Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2248 (2016).
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thus incompatible with the modified categorical approach.86 The result exacerbated Justice Kennedy’s fears, today making a trial court’s determination
as to whether burglary convictions qualify as ACCA predicates almost
wholly dependent on the exact wording of state law – a result Congress
overtly intended to avoid.87
In Mathis, the Court examined Iowa’s burglary statute. The law criminalized not only burglarizing a building or other structure, but also land, water, or air vehicles.88 The government and the defendant agreed the statute
failed the formal categorical approach because the Iowa statute swept broader
than the generic federal definition of burglary on its face.89 The government
instead argued the defendant’s five prior burglary convictions qualified as
violent felonies because the Shepard documents for each conviction showed
the defendant burglarized structures, not vehicles.90 The Eighth Circuit sided
with the government, finding the modified categorical approach applied even
if the statute listed alternative means.91 Accordingly, the appeals court applied the modified categorical approach and affirmed the ACCA enhancement.92
After granting certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed, finding the statute
indivisible because it listed the burglary of a building or other structure and
the burglary of a vehicle as alternative means of committing the crime.93 Justice Kagan, again writing for the Court, explained that the text and legislative
history of ACCA favored focusing exclusively on the elements of an offense,

86. Id. at 2257.
87. See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 589 (1990) (interpreting Congressional intent
behind the 1986 amendments to ACCA as “extending the range of predicate offenses to all crimes
having certain common characteristics . . . regardless of how they were labeled by state law.”); see
also S. REP. NO. 98-190, at 20 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3199 (stating a purpose
for the inclusion of burglary in ACCA as being to “ensure, to the extent that it is consistent with the
prerogatives of the States in defining their own offenses, that the same type of conduct is punishable
on the Federal level in all cases.”).
88. Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2250.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 2250–51. The Court noted the Eighth Circuit’s Mathis decision widened a circuit
split. Compare United States v. Mathis, 786 F.3d 1068 (8th Cir. 2015) (holding statutes listing alternative means qualified as predicate ACCA felonies under the modified categorical approach);
United States v. Ozier, 796 F.3d 597 (6th Cir. 2015) (same); and United States v. Trent, 767 F.3d
1046 (10th Cir. 2014) (same), with Rendon v. Holder, 764 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding statutes listing alternative means precluded application of the modified categorical approach); and
Omargharib v. Holder, 775 F.3d 192 (4th Cir. 2014) (same).
93. Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2251.
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not its underlying factual circumstances.94 The Court reasoned ACCA’s language applied the enhancement only for “previous convictions,” not for
simply committing the offense regardless of the conclusion of a trier of fact,
accordingly precluding circumstance-specific inquiries.95 Therefore, the
Court held the Eighth Circuit erred in applying the modified categorical approach to Iowa’s burglary statute.96
Much like the Taylor Court articulated tests for when a burglary conviction qualified as an ACCA predicate, the Mathis Court had to enunciate a
standard for when a statute listed separate elements of burglary versus alternative means of committing the crime.97 First, the Court explained if state
case law has explicitly held a burglary statute lists alternative elements or
alternative means, that interpretation quickly dispenses with the issue.98
Conveniently, the Iowa Supreme Court had previously held the state’s burglary statute enumerated “alternative methods” of committing burglary, resolving the issue and precluding the application of the modified categorical
approach.99
Inconveniently, not a single state high court other than Iowa’s had definitively ruled as to whether their state’s burglary statute listed alternative
elements or means.100 In the absence of case law, the Court explained the
plain language of a state statute could also shed light on the elements versus
means distinction.101 For example, if a burglary statute ascribes different
criminal penalties for violations of the various alternatives, then the alternatives would be separate elements.102 On the other hand, if the alternatives
simply list “illustrative examples” of methods for committing burglary, then
those examples would be means. 103 Penultimately, in a seeming about-face

94. Id.
95. Id. at 2252.
96. Id. at 2253.
97. Id. at 2256.
98. Id.
99. Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2256 (noting further the “alternative methods” designation by the
Iowa Supreme Court meant the statute did not require jury unanimity as to whether the location
burglarized was a building, other structure, or vehicle).
100. Id. at 2269 (Alito, J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 2256 (majority opinion).
102. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). The Court has frequently intimated, but never explicitly held, that Apprendi poses Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury issues
in the context of fact-specific inquires under ACCA. See generally Rebecca Sharpless, Finally, a
True Elements Test: Mathis v. United States and the Categorical Approach, 82 BROOK. L. REV.
1275, 1295–98 (2017). For the limited purpose of examining state burglary convictions as violent
felonies under ACCA, this Note does not examine these Sixth Amendment concerns in detail.
103. Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2256.
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from Taylor and Shepard, the Court endorsed a “peek” at the record documents not to determine if the jury or plea judge necessarily found the defendant committed generic burglary, but rather only for the extremely narrow purpose of discerning whether the statute in fact listed alternative elements for
burglary.104 Finally, the Court admitted in situations where both the statute
and the record failed to provide clarity, Taylor’s “demand for certainty”
simply ruled out the application of an ACCA enhancement altogether.105
Justice Kennedy again joined the majority decision, believing it to accurately reflect the Court’s ACCA precedent.106 But he wrote separately to
express serious doubt about the direction of that precedent, characterizing the
decision as a “stark illustration of the arbitrary and inequitable results produced by applying an elements based approach to this sentencing scheme.”107
He asserted Congress simply could not have intended to subject the same
criminal conduct to wide disparities in sentencing based on the specific wording of state law and advocated for revisiting the Court’s ACCA decisions.108
Mathis also drew two dissents, one from Justice Breyer and another from
Justice Alito. Although Justice Breyer joined the majority in Descamps, he
asserted the Court’s decision to preclude the application of the modified categorical approach to any statute that lists alternative means went too far.109
He argued the trial court’s finding – through the documents specifically endorsed in Taylor and Shepard – that the defendant had in fact committed generic burglary should have been enough to satisfy the ACCA requirement.110
Poignantly, Justice Breyer cited to eight state burglary statutes nearly identical to Iowa’s that the Court’s decision jeopardized and argued Taylor required ACCA burglary to reflect the laws of most states.111 Finally, he asserted most prosecutors clearly allege the means a defendant employs in
committing a crime, intimating a jury oftentimes still necessarily finds generic burglary under an indivisible statute.112
Justice Alito penned a scathing dissent, using a hypothetical plea colloquy as an example of what he asserted was the absurdity of the majority’s
104. Id. at 2256–57 (citing Rendon v. Holder, 782 F.3d 466, 473–74 (9th Cir. 2015) (Kozinski,
J., dissenting from denial of reh’g en banc)).
105. Id. at 2257.
106. Id. at 2258 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2259 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 2260.
111. Id. at 2263–64; see, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 45-2-101, 45-6-201, 45-6-204 (West
2017); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. §§ 12.1-22-02, 12.1-22-06 (West 2017); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§
22-32-1, 22-32-3, 22-32-8 (2017).
112. Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2264 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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elements versus means conclusion.113 The hypothetical presented a trial
judge repeatedly asking a defendant whether he had burglarized a building.114
After the defendant admitted to burglarizing a house at 10 Main Street, the
fictitious judge proceeded to ask questions such as, “Could it have actually
been a boat?” and “Is 10 Main Street possibly a vehicle?” to which the defendant consistently responded the burglary took place in a house.115 Justice
Alito’s point, of course, was that even when a defendant unequivocally, absolutely admits to an offense containing the elements of generic burglary, the
Court’s holding barred the application of an ACCA enhancement simply because the state’s statute listed alternative means of committing the crime.116
With the sheer volume of guidance the Supreme Court has provided
lower federal courts, determining when a state burglary conviction qualifies
as a violent felony under ACCA should be “easy” for federal sentencing
judges, as Justice Kagan predicted.117 Dishearteningly, the reality has been
much closer to Justice Alito’s dissenting wish to judges tasked with applying
ACCA — “good luck.”118
III. POST-MATHIS EIGHTH CIRCUIT DECISIONS INVALIDATING
STATE BURGLARY STATUTES AS PREDICATE FELONIES
Instead of providing clarity to federal appellate courts, Mathis has produced multiple circuit splits and inconsistency across the board.119 Moreover, federal courts of appeals have scrambled frenetically to revisit state burglary statutes long held to qualify as ACCA predicates, invalidating many.120
A flurry of recent Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals decisions illustrates this
trend. The Eighth Circuit’s analysis of three state burglary statutes highlights
two circuit splits directly resulting from Mathis.121 More importantly, the
overwhelming result of Mathis has been the erasure of state burglary convictions as qualifying violent felonies under ACCA.122

113. Id. at 2270 (Alito, J., dissenting).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 2271.
117. Id. at 2256 (majority opinion).
118. Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2268 (Alito, J., dissenting).
119. See infra notes 134, 142.
120. See infra note 170.
121. See, e.g., Recent Case, Criminal Law – Armed Career Criminal Act – Eighth Circuit
Holds that Generic Burglary Requires Intent at First Moment of Trespass, 131 HARV. L. REV. 642,
645 (2017).
122. See discussion infra Part III.A–C.
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A. MINNESOTA: UNITED STATES V. MCARTHUR
One of the Eighth Circuit’s first decisions invalidating a burglary statute
as an ACCA predicate came only seven months after Mathis.123 In United
States v. McArthur, William Morris, one of three defendants in the case, challenged the application of an ACCA enhancement to his sentence, arguing his
third-degree Minnesota burglary convictions did not qualify as violent felonies.124 The court determined the Minnesota statute listed alternative means
of committing burglary, which reads:
Whoever enters a building without consent and with intent to steal
or commit any felony or gross misdemeanor while in the building,
or enters a building without consent and steals or commits a felony
or gross misdemeanor while in the building . . . commits burglary in
the third degree and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more
than five years.125
Although the first clause, requiring intent to commit a crime, contains the
generic elements of burglary, the second clause does not require intent and
therefore sweeps broader than generic federal burglary.126 Thus, the case
hinged on whether the statute was divisible into separate elements or simply
listed alternative means to commit the offense.127
Just one year earlier, the disjunctive “or” separating the first and second
offense clauses convinced the court that the exact same statute listed alternative elements.128 But Mathis demanded a different outcome.129 The court
pointed to an unpublished Minnesota Court of Appeals decision holding jury
unanimity on the defendant’s intent, or lack thereof, to commit a crime was
not required for a third-degree burglary conviction.130 Accordingly, the court

123. United States v. McArthur, 850 F.3d 925 (8th Cir. 2017).
124. Id. at 937.
125. Id.; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.582(3) (West 2017).
126. McArthur, 850 F.3d at 938.
127. Id.
128. See United States v. McArthur, 836 F.3d 931, 943 (8th Cir. 2016) (stating without explanation that Minnesota’s third-degree burglary statute “is divisible.”), amended and superseded by
McArthur, 850 F.3d 925.
129. McArthur, 850 F.3d at 938 (“Here, Mathis requires us to treat the alternatives in the Minnesota third-degree burglary statute as ‘means’ rather than ‘elements.’”).
130. Id. (citing Minnesota v. Gonzales, No. A15-0975, 2016 WL 3222795, at *2–3 (Minn. Ct.
App. Jun. 13, 2016)).
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held the statute listed alternative means, compelling the court to examine the
statute under only the formal categorical approach.131
Notwithstanding the inability to use the modified categorical approach,
the government argued the generic federal definition of burglary was broad
enough to encompass the second alternative categorically because an offender necessarily formed the intent to commit a crime while “remaining in”
the building or occupied structure.132 The court disagreed with the government’s position, reasoning that to qualify as generic burglary, a defendant
had to form the intent to commit a crime before trespassing, whether by unlawful entry or remaining past the owner’s consent.133 The court also pointed
to a circuit split on the issue, with the Fourth and Sixth Circuit Courts of
Appeals finding no intent required at the time of the trespass, and the Fifth
and the Eighth finding the opposite.134 Consequently, the court held Morris’
conviction did not qualify as an ACCA predicate.135
B. ARKANSAS: UNITED STATES V. SIMS
Less than three months after McArthur, the Eighth Circuit invalidated
yet another state burglary statute as a qualifying offense under ACCA.136 In
United States v. Sims, the court considered Arkansas’ residential burglary
statute, codified as “enter[ing] or remain[ing] unlawfully in a residential occupiable structure of another person with the purpose of committing in the
residential occupiable structure any offense punishable by imprisonment.”137
The court focused its attention on the phrase “residential occupiable structure,” which state law defined as a “vehicle, building, or other structure: (i)
[i]n which any person lives; or (ii) [t]hat is customarily used for overnight
accommodation of a person whether or not a person is actually present.”138
The Supreme Court in Mathis stated burglary statutes encompassing
land, air, or water vehicles swept broader than the generic federal definition
of burglary.139 However, the government argued that because the Arkansas

131. Id.
132. Id. at 939.
133. Id. at 940.
134. Id. at 939; compare United States v. Priddy, 808 F.3d 676, 685 (6th Cir. 2015); United
States v. Bonilla, 687 F.3d 188, 192–194 (4th Cir. 2012), with McArthur, 850 F.3d at 939; United
States v. Herrera-Montes, 490 F.3d 390, 392 (5th Cir. 2007).
135. Id.
136. United States v. Sims, 854 F.3d 1037 (8th Cir. 2017).
137. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-39-201(a)(1) (West 2017).
138. Sims, 854 F.3d at 1039 (citing ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-39-101(4)(A)); see also ARK. CODE
ANN. § 5-39-101(8)(A) (defining “residential occupiable structure”).
139. Sims, 854 F.3d at 1040 (citing Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2250 (2016)).
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statute only proscribed the burglary of vehicles used as living accommodations, the provision fit within the “occupied structure” language of the generic
federal definition.140 Again, the appeals court pointed to a circuit split Mathis
exacerbated.141 For example, the Tenth Circuit concluded burglary of vehicles “adopted for overnight accommodation” constituted generic burglary of
an occupied structure while the Fourth and the Ninth Circuits rejected similar
arguments.142 Relying on its prior decision in United States v. Lamb,143
which held burglary of a motor home was broader than generic burglary, the
court rejected the government’s argument and precluded application of the
modified categorical approach to the Arkansas residential burglary statute.144
C. NORTH DAKOTA: UNITED STATES V. KINNEY
Circling back to Jonathan Kinney, following the district court’s imposition of a ninety-month federal prison sentence, he challenged the application
of the ACCA enhancement in the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.145 Kinney
argued North Dakota’s burglary statute was overbroad because, like the Arkansas statute, the term “occupied structure” included vehicles.146 The North
Dakota burglary statute reads as follows:
A person is guilty of burglary if he willfully enters or surreptitiously
remains in a building or occupied structure, or a separately secured
or occupied portion thereof, when at the time the premises are not
open to the public and the actor is not licensed, invited, or otherwise
privileged to enter or remain as the case may be, with intent to commit a crime therein.147
At first blush, the statute appears to mirror the generic federal definition
almost exactly, and indeed the district court explicitly stated as much.148 The
North Dakota statute plainly satisfies the first and third elements of generic
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Compare United States v. Spring, 80 F.3d 1450, 146–62 (10th Cir. 1996), with Sims, 854
F.3d at 1040; United States v. White, 836 F.3d 437, 444–46 (4th Cir. 2016); and United States v.
Grisel, 488 F.3d 844, 850–51 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc).
143. 847 F.3d 928 (8th Cir. 2017), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Jul. 10, 2017) (No. 17-5152).
144. Sims, 854 F.3d at 1040.
145. Brief for Appellant at 2, United States v. Kinney,—F 3d —, 2018 WL 1903772 (8th Cir.
Apr. 23, 2018) (No. 16-3764).
146. Id. at 5.
147. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-22-02(1) (West 2017).
148. Brief for Appellee at 7, Kinney,—F.3d —, 2018 WL 1903772 (No. 16-3764).
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burglary because it requires unlawful entry and intent to commit a crime prior
to trespassing.149 Yet, the “building or occupied structure” element posed a
problem. Buried one layer deeper in the Century Code, “occupied structure”
is defined as:
A structure or vehicle:
a. Where any person lives or carries on business or other calling; or
b. Which is used for overnight accommodation of persons.
c. Any such structure or vehicle is deemed to be “occupied”
regardless of whether a person is actually present.150
Accordingly, Kinney raised two issues for the court to consider: (1)
whether the “building or structure” element of generic burglary encompassed
vehicles used only for living or business purposes under the categorical approach; and (2) if not, whether the “building or occupied structure” language
in the North Dakota statute was divisible into separate elements and thus
amenable to analysis under the modified categorical approach.151 The Eighth
Circuit resolved both of these issues in two separate decisions, leading to the
demise of North Dakota’s burglary statute as an ACCA predicate.152
The Eighth Circuit quickly answered the first question. Kinney and the
government filed briefs for the appeal prior to the decision in United States
v. Sims, which conclusively held vehicles used for living accommodations do
not satisfy the “occupied structure” element of generic burglary, as explained
above. 153 Accordingly, the court held the North Dakota statute was categorically broader than generic burglary.154
The Eighth Circuit settled the thornier issue, whether the North Dakota
statute was divisible, when it decided United States v. Naylor, an en banc
decision examining nearly identical “building or inhabitable structure” language in Missouri’s second-degree burglary statute.155 Naylor relied heavily

149. Id. at 18–19.
150. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-22-06(4) (West 2017) (emphasis added).
151. See Brief for Appellee at 18, 27, Kinney,—F.3d —, 2018 WL 1903772 (No. 16-3764).
152. Kinney,—F.3d —, 2018 WL 1903772, at *3.
153. United States v. Sims, 854 F.3d 1037, 1040 (8th Cir. 2017); see also United States v.
Lamb, 847 F.3d 928, 931 (8th Cir. 2017), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Jul. 10, 2017) (No. 17-5152).
154. Kinney,—F.3d —, 2018 WL 1903772, at *2.
155. United States v. Naylor, 887 F.3d 397 (8th Cir. 2018) (en banc).
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on state case law to conclude that the “building or inhabitable structure” language constituted alternative means, even though “Missouri courts ha[d] not
yet decided the precise issue.”156 Notably, Naylor’s reasoning appears to
significantly expand the scope of decisional law available for review to determine divisibility. Mathis only endorsed looking to case law that “definitively answers” the elements versus means question.157 But the Eighth Circuit went far beyond that, relying on “Missouri’s well-established rule that
disjunctive phrases in criminal statutes should be treated as methods of committing a single crime” emanating from multiple decisions.158 True to form
for ACCA decisions, Naylor drew two dissents. Judge Loken in particular
argued the majority impermissibly construed Mathis as overruling Taylor by
entirely disallowing review of the trial-record documents in favor of examining case law and model jury instructions.159 He also asserted the decision
came to “a result so contrary to the obvious intent of Congress as to constitute
judicial legislation that is beyond our Article III powers.”160 Nonetheless,
the court held Missouri’s second-degree burglary statute was indivisible and
therefore did not qualify as a violent felony.161
As a result, the government’s primary argument in Kinney for the North
Dakota burglary statute’s divisibility – the existence of the disjunctive “or”
separating “building” from “occupied structure” – did not persuade the
panel.162 In a footnote, the court explained the disjunctive “or” did not conclusively establish divisibility, but instead merely triggered the elements versus means analysis.163 Even prior to Naylor, a careful reading of the Eighth
Circuit’s decision in McArthur likely doomed the North Dakota statute.
There, the court reissued a previously rendered opinion specifically to address a similar issue in Minnesota’s burglary statute.164 Despite the existence
of a disjunctive “or,” the court nevertheless found “Mathis requires us to treat
the alternatives . . . as ‘means’ rather than ‘elements.’”165 Perhaps most convincingly, Justice Breyer explicitly pointed to North Dakota’s burglary statute as being “very much like” the Iowa statute the Supreme Court invalidated

156. Id. at 402.
157. Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2256 (2016).
158. Naylor, 887 F.3d at 402.
159. Id. at 409 (Loken, J., dissenting).
160. Id.
161. Id. at 406–07 (majority opinion).
162. Brief for Appellee at 29, United States v. Kinney,—F.3d —, 2018 WL 1903772 (8th Cir.
Apr. 23, 2018) (No. 16-3764).
163. Kinney,—F.3d —, 2018 WL 1903772, at *3 n.1.
164. See United States v. McArthur, 850 F.3d 925, 938 (8th Cir. 2017).
165. Id.
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in Mathis.166 After finding state case law and the plain language of the North
Dakota statute unhelpful, the Kinney court resorted to a “peek” at the trial
record documents.167 The indictment charged the defendant with burgling “a
building or occupied structure” without specificity.168 Therefore, the court
determined the statute listed alternative means and invalidated the North Dakota burglary statute as a qualifying ACCA offense.169
IV. EFFECT OF THE ABROGRATION OF BURGLARY AS A
QUALIFYING ENUMERATED OFFENSE
With the Eighth Circuit’s recent nullification of the North Dakota and
Missouri statutes, burglary convictions in only two of seven states under the
court’s jurisdiction now qualify as violent felonies.170 From a law intended
to uniformly punish “the same type of conduct” across the nation, to a law
that today punishes based largely on which side of a river the defendant commits burglary on, the modern application of ACCA is a judicial disaster.171
Mathis and its lower court progeny now wreak two kinds of havoc. First, the
Act’s application flies in the face of a bedrock tenet of the American justice
system: fairness. The imposition of a fifteen-year mandatory minimum federal prison sentence applies erratically – harming, not helping, unwitting defendants caught on the wrong side of a state line.172 Second, the Supreme
Court’s virtual elimination of burglary as a violent felony from a statute that
manifestly, unquestionably includes burglary, represents a frightening endaround of the separation of powers between Congress and the judiciary.173
Consequently, the time has come for Congress to reassert its authority and
resurrect ACCA as an effective law enforcement tool.

166. Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2263 (2016) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
167. Kinney,—F.3d —, 2018 WL 1903772, at *3.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. See Mathis, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (majority opinion) (Iowa); Kinney,—F 3d —, 2018 WL
1903772 (North Dakota); United States v. Naylor, 887 F 3d 397 (8th Cir. 2018) (en banc) (Missouri); United States v. Sims, 854 F.3d 1037 (8th Cir. 2017) (Arkansas); United States v. McArthur,
850 F.3d 925 (8th Cir. 2017) (Minnesota).
171. Compare United States v. Lamb, 847 F.3d 928, 932 (8th Cir. 2017), petition for cert.
filed, (U.S. Jul. 10, 2017) (No. 17-5152), with McArthur, 850 F.3d at 940.
172. See cases cited supra, note 171.
173. See Michael M. Pacheo, Comment, The Armed Career Criminal Act: When Burglary Is
Not Burglary, 26 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 171, 190 (1989) (arguing an interpretation of burglary under
the Act exclusive of most states’ burglary statutes “would lead to an absurd result.”).
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A. FLAWS IN THE MODERN APPLICATION OF THE ARMED
CAREER CRIMINAL ACT
When adopting the generic federal definition of burglary, the Supreme
Court hoped defendants would be “protected . . . from the unfairness of having enhancement depend upon the label employed by the State of conviction.”174 Twenty-eight years after Taylor, the verdict is in – the Court failed.
Today, more than any other time in its three-decade history, the application
of ACCA is unjust.
First, the modern application of the Act is arbitrary, depending almost
exclusively on the precise verbiage of state law.175 This despite overt Congressional intent to ensure “the same type of conduct is punishable on the
Federal level in all cases.”176 In the wake of Mathis, it no longer matters
whether a defendant like Jonathan Kinney plainly admits to burglarizing a
grocery store or storage unit – conduct that no doubt satisfies the generic
definition of burglary.177 A court’s consideration is now limited almost exclusively to the words of the statute in front of it, the very “vagaries of state
law” both Congress and the Supreme Court sought to avoid.178 The murkiness of ACCA is most frightening for defendants, those with the most to lose
from its arbitrary application. Predictability of outcome is a paramount purpose of law – ACCA today offers none.179
The present application of ACCA is also patently unfair to defendants
unfortunate enough to have three burglary convictions in a state with a qualifying statute. Why should a person who sticks up three grocery stores in
Wisconsin receive fifteen years in prison while a person who does the same
in Minnesota receives less than one?180 Here, ACCA throws “fundamental
174. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 589 (1990).
175. Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 293 (2013) (Alito, J., dissenting).
176. S. REP. NO. 98-190, at 20 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3199 (emphasis
added).
177. Brief for Appellee at 3–5, United States v. Kinney,—F.3d —, 2018 WL 1903772 (8th
Cir. Apr. 23, 2018) (No. 16-3764).
178. Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2257 (2016) (explaining analysis under ACCA
“involves, and involves only, comparing elements”).
179. See Antonin Scalia, Assorted Canards of Contemporary Legal Analysis, 40 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 581, 588 (1990) (“Besides its centrality to the rule of law in general, consistency has a special role to play in judge-made law – both judge-pronounced common law and judge-pronounced
determinations of the application of statutory and constitutional provisions.”); see also cases cited
supra note 171 and accompanying text.
180. Because the Minnesota statute does not qualify as an ACCA predicate, convicted burglars
unlawfully in possession of firearms in Minnesota are subject only to state criminal penalties. MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 624.713(2)(c) (West 2017); see also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.02(3) (West 2017)
(defining gross misdemeanor as an offense carrying a sentence of more than ninety days, but less
than one year).
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fairness,” an express aim of Congress when enacting the statute, to the
wind.181 Still, some commentators have enthusiastically welcomed the abrogation of burglary convictions as qualifying ACCA offenses in the name of
“soften[ing] the edges of harsh federal sentencing practices.”182 Reducing
the length of prison sentences is certainly a worthy goal. But placing that
goal above the basic fairness of our justice system is a price too steep to pay.
Although the net result of Mathis and its progeny will certainly be fewer
ACCA sentences, thousands of defendants will remain incarcerated for the
duration of a fifteen-year term while others who committed identical crimes
go free.183 The sole difference for those left behind will be their state of
conviction.
Furthermore, with the onslaught of state burglary statutes invalidated after Mathis, judicial interpretation of the statute now thwarts ACCA’s plain
language.184 The Taylor Court benevolently noted its generic definition
struck a balance “roughly corresponding to the definitions of burglary in a
majority of States’ criminal codes.”185 As the paltry number of qualifying
burglary statutes in the Eighth Circuit now demonstrates, the Court’s elements versus means test falls far short of this goal as well.186 As a result, the
mandate that “burglary” qualify as a violent felony under 18 U.S.C. §
924(e)(2)(B)(ii) is now gutted, left to the flimsy distinction between elements
and means, a distinction state legislatures could not possibly have anticipated
when drafting burglary statutes.187 The Court has now all but erased a class
of offenses Congress unequivocally included in a sentencing scheme.188 The
Court’s usurpation of legislative authority is exacerbated because burglary
was one of only two crimes that triggered ACCA enhancement in the original
iteration of the statute.189
The Supreme Court’s eagerness to discard the plain language of ACCA
is all the more perplexing because Mathis bucked the Court’s own precedent.
181. See supra note 176.
182. Rebecca Sharpless, Finally, a True Elements Test: Mathis v. United States and the Categorical Approach, 82 BROOK. L. REV. 1275, 1276 (2017); see also, Jessica A. Roth, The Divisibility
of Crime, 64 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 95, 97 (2015) (explaining the Supreme Court’s divisibility analysis
“prompted the reversal of a number of . . . federal ACCA sentences.”).
183. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
184. Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2268 (2016) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“Congress
indisputably wanted burglary to count under ACCA”).
185. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 589 (1990).
186. See cases cited supra note 170.
187. Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 279 (2013) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (explaining the effect of the divisibility analysis is “an unspecified number, but likely a large number, of
state criminal statutes . . . now must be amended by state legislatures.”).
188. See supra note 175.
189. Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, ch. 18, 98 Stat. 1837.
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Justice Kagan’s Mathis opinion concluded “we have repeatedly made clear
that application of ACCA involves, and involves only, comparing elements.”190 If this had indeed been the Court’s stance “[f]or more than 25
years,” then the federal district and appellate courts tasked with the everyday
administration of ACCA sentences missed the memo.191 Had an elementsonly approach truly represented the Court’s uninterrupted precedent from
ACCA’s enactment onward, Mathis would have changed nothing. Instead,
it has resulted in the annulment of almost every state burglary statute in the
Eighth Circuit in less than two years.192
B. CONGRESS MUST REVISIT THE ARMED CAREER CRIMINAL
ACT TO ENDORSE CONDUCT-BASED INQUIRIES
The judicially created imbroglio that is the modern ACCA demands
Congressional action. Twice in the last five years, Justice Kennedy has explicitly called for the legislative branch to provide clarity.193 Most recently,
he expressed dismay at the ability of Congress to respond in his Mathis concurrence, and even signaled the Court should revisit its ACCA decisions in
the future.194 Despite Justice Kennedy’s pessimism for Congressional action,
less than two months after the announcement of Mathis, the U.S. Sentencing
Commission submitted a report to Congress on recidivist sentence enhancements that has already spurred the seeds of change.195
In the report, the Commission relayed its decision to eliminate burglary
as a “crime of violence” under the career offender sentencing guidelines and
urged Congress to adopt a similar stance for the definition of “violent felony”
under ACCA for uniformity.196 However, the purpose of ACCA is fundamentally different from the career offender guidelines.197 The “crime of violence” provision is aimed squarely at violent recidivism, whereas ACCA is
190. Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2257 (2016).
191. Id.; see, e.g., United States v. McArthur, 850 F.3d 925 (8th Cir. 2017) (reversing previously published opinion in light of Mathis.).
192. See cases cited supra note 170.
193. Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2258 (Kennedy, J. concurring); Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S.
254, 279 (2013) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
194. Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2258 (Kennedy, J. concurring) (expressing “continued congressional
inaction in the face of a system that each year proves more unworkable should require this Court to
revisit its precedents in an appropriate case.”).
195. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: CAREER OFFENDER
SENTENCING
ENHANCEMENTS
(2016),
available
at
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/news/congressional-testimony-and-reports/criminal-history/201607_RtC-CareerOffenders.pdf.
196. Id. at 55.
197. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B), with U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §
4B1.2(a) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2016) (in addition to those codified in ACCA, the “crime of
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concerned with both violent crime and significant harm to property.198 Indeed, the House report on the original version of ACCA labeled burglaries as
“the most damaging crimes to society” specifically because of their violent
nature and ruinous impact on property.199 Eliminating burglary would directly contravene the genesis for enacting ACCA in the first place, leaving a
wide gap in federal law enforcement capabilities.200
Accordingly, Congress should permit federal sentencing judges to employ conduct-based inquires for ACCA purposes.201 As Justice Alito stated
in Descamps, “When it is clear that a defendant necessarily admitted or the
jury necessarily found that the defendant committed the elements of generic
burglary, the conviction should qualify.”202 ACCA’s predicament does not
result from the definition the Supreme Court selected, even though it is highly
questionable that Congress intended for a generic definition of burglary. The
true dilemma is the method used to determine if that definition is satisfied.203
A conduct-based inquiry, wielding only the documents endorsed in Taylor
and Shepard, would return ACCA to punishing “the same conduct” uniformly.204 In endorsing Justice Alito’s approach, Congress can ensure fundamental fairness in the application of the law and renew ACCA’s effectiveness as a tool to keep Americans safe.
V. CONCLUSION
The Armed Career Criminal Act’s nearly three-decade history is a microcosm of several important debates in our society, ranging from recidivism
and mass incarceration to the separation of powers between co-equal
branches of government. Mathis and the slew of federal appellate decisions
it has spawned sharpen those debates exponentially.205 Of particular note to
local practitioners, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals recently invalidated
North Dakota’s burglary statute as a violent felony for ACCA purposes.206
As a result, Kinney will touch off a firestorm of litigation for federal criminal

violence” enumerated offenses include murder, voluntary manslaughter, kidnapping, aggravated assault, and forcible sex offenses).
198. See infra note 199.
199. H.R. REP. NO. 98-1073, at 2–3 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3661, 3663.
200. See id.; DEP’T OF JUST., U.S. ATT’YS ANN. STAT. REP. at 16 (2016).
201. Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 284 (Alito, J., dissenting). Justice Alito also
dismissed the majority’s Sixth Amendment concerns with a conduct-based approach. Id. at 291.
202. Id. at 281.
203. Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2258 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
204. See supra note 176.
205. See supra note 170.
206. See supra Part III.C.
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law practitioners in North Dakota. And it has eliminated yet another statute
from a sentencing scheme unquestionably intended to encompass burglary
convictions from its inception.207 The onus now falls on Congress to wrangle
the runaway application of ACCA back from the judiciary. Every moment
of delay perpetuates the unequal application of a law that exacts retribution
in fifteen-year increments.
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